Double Matching: Social Contacts in a Labour Market with On-the-Job Search by Zaharieva, Anna
Institute of
Mathematical
Economics
Working Papers
473
December 2012
Double Matching: Social Contacts
in a Labour Market with On-the-Job Search
Anna Zaharieva
IMW · Bielefeld University
Postfach 100131
33501 Bielefeld · Germany
email: imw@wiwi.uni-bielefeld.de
http://www.imw.uni-bielefeld.de/research/wp473.php
ISSN: 0931-6558
Double Matching: Social Contacts
in a Labour Market with On-the-Job Search
Anna Zaharieva∗
Institute of Mathematical Economics
Bielefeld University, 33501 Bielefeld, Germany
December 4, 2012
Abstract
This paper develops a labour market matching model with heterogeneous firms, on-the-
job search and referrals. Social capital is endogenous, so that better connected workers
bargain higher wages for a given level of productivity. This is a positive effect of referrals
on reservation wages. At the same time, employees accept job offers from more productive
employers and forward other offers to their unemployed social contacts. Therefore, the aver-
age productivity of a referred worker is lower than the average productivity in the market.
This is a negative selection effect of referrals on wages. In the equilibrium, wage premiums
(penalties) associated with referrals are more likely in labour markets with lower (higher)
productivity heterogeneity and lower (higher) worker’s bargaining power. Next, the model
is extended to allow workers help each other climb a wage ladder. On-the-job search is then
intensified and wage inequality is reduced as workers employed in high paid jobs pool their
less successful contacts towards the middle range of the productivity distribution.
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1 Introduction
Careers are not made up of random jumps from one job to another, but rather that individuals
rely on contacts acquired at various stages of their work-life, and before.
M. Granovetter (1995, p. 85)
About 30% of job separations in developed countries can be attributed to job-to-job tran-
sitions. At the same time there is strong empirical evidence that 30 − 60% of new hires find
jobs through personal contacts. On the one hand, this suggests that workers continue searching
on-the-job and climb a wage-ladder by changing employers. On the other hand, employees help
their social contacts find a (better paid) job. This paper argues that the two processes are
strongly related as individuals simultaneously decide whether to accept an offer and change the
job or forward it to a friend. Formally, this study extends the Burdett and Mortensen (1998)
model by incorporating referrals into the process of job-to-job transitions. The primary purpose
of the paper is to analyze the effect of social contacts on wages and to identify economic factors
that lead to premiums or penalties in wages associated with social networks.
This research question, whether the effect of social contacts on wages is positive or negative,
remains highly controversial and intensively debated in the literature. For example, in a recent
empirical study Pelizzari (2010) shows that in the European Union ”... premiums and penalties
to finding jobs through personal contacts are equally frequent and are of about the same size.”
(p. 1). Empirical evidence for the United States is also mixed. Whereas Simon and Warner
(1992), Granovetter (1995) and Kugler (2003) estimate a positive effect of referrals on wages,
Bentolila, Michelacci and Suarez (2010) provide support for the hypothesis of wage penalties
associated with referrals. The same is true for France, where there is contradicting evidence of
wage premiums by Margolis and Simonnet (2003) and wage penalties by Delattre and Sabatier
(2007). The general conclusion one can draw from these findings, is that labour market conditions
and economic environment, as represented by firm and worker heterogeneity, the mechanism of
wage-setting, the type of social contacts, the possibility of on-the-job search and other factors
may play an important role for the effect of social contacts on wages.
To analyze a number of these factors, I consider a labour market model with on-the-job
search and referrals. Social contacts are modelled following a seminal approach by Montgomery
(1994), so the population is composed of an endogenous number of two-person groups (dyads)
and single workers (monads). Moreover, every connected worker can help his/her dyad part-
ner find a (better paid) job. This is the informal channel of job search. Further, this paper
incorporates empirical evidence from sociology that social interaction is organized into foci such
as workplaces, clubs, groups, and associations which individuals may belong to. For example,
Rivera, Soderstrom and Uzzi (2010) report that the foci of shared activities play an important
role in fostering social contacts, however, the loss of shared foci may induce the breaking apart
of network ties. In order to incorporate this empirical evidence I assume that unmatched em-
ployed individuals randomly form dyad ties with their colleagues (”roommate matching”). At
the same time, there is a positive probability of dissolving for the tie if both workers become un-
employed. Therefore, the total number of dyads is endogenous in the model and the equilibrium
unemployment is decreasing in the speed of contact formation.
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Firms are heterogeneous with respect to their productivity and wages are determined by
means of Nash bargaining1. Thus wages are increasing in the employer’s productivity and the
reservation wage of the worker. Moreover, on-the-job search implies that workers accept job
offers from more productive employers so that job-to-job transitions have a positive effect on
worker’s earnings. However, job offers from less productive employers are not lost, instead work-
ers forward these offers to their contacts. With respect to the information structure, I assume
that connected workers do not observe the flow income of their contacts. Next I distinguish
between two modelling regimes. In the first regime, the unemployment status of the worker
is explicitly observed by the dyad partner and job information is only transmitted in order to
help the unemployed dyad partner find a job. In the second regime, the model is extended to
allow connected workers to help each other find a better paid job. However, to simplify the
model I assume that unemployment insurance is provided in the form of a public job, thus the
state of unemployment is not observed by the dyad partner and job offers are exchanged in an
unconditional manner.
The major contribution of this study is to show that job offers transmitted through social
contacts are biased towards the left tail of the productivity distribution. This means that the
productivity of workers finding jobs through social contacts is below the average in the economy,
which has a negative effect on wages. This negative selection effect is an inherent feature of the
model in a first information regime, since the distribution of network offers for every unemployed
worker is limited from above by the current productivity of the dyad partner. Formally, this
means that in a first information regime, the equilibrium productivity distribution with network
effects is first order stochastically dominated by the productivity distribution without network
effects. Moreover, from an empirical perspective this finding implies that it is essential to control
for the (un)observed heterogeneity of employers and hierarchical positions within an occupation
in the estimation of the ex-post effect of social contacts on wages. Otherwise, there is risk for
the estimator to be biased towards the finding of wage penalties.
Second, this paper identifies a counteracting positive effect of social contacts on wages. This
effect arises from the possibility to exchange information within a dyad and leads to endogenous
heterogeneity of workers by social capital. For example, in the second information regime, work-
ers are endogenously differentiated into two groups (with high and low social capital) depending
on the presence of the dyad partner. This effect is originally investigated in Fontaine (2008)
and means that the reservation wage of a connected worker is higher than the reservation wage
of a single worker.2 Therefore, wage bargaining with the same employer will generally lead to
a higher negotiated wage if the worker’s social capital is high. Further, this paper proves that
the value of social capital is increasing in the duration of contacts; that is, a higher speed of
contact formation (dissolution) has a positive (negative) effect on differences in the reservation
wages between the two groups of workers. This result is supported by the empirical evidence in
sociology, for example, Lin (1999) describes it by writing that ”the weakest ties are clearly not
1To keep the model tractable I assume that the state of unemployment is the only worker’s outside option,
which means that workers can not hold two jobs at the same time. This simplifying approach was originally applied
by Pissarides (1994) and then Gautier (2002). The advantage is that labour contracts are renegotiation-proof.
2Burdett and Mortesen (1998) prove that worker’s reservation wage is equal to the unemployment benefit if
on-the-job search is equally efficient as off-the-job search. Although this requirment is satisfied in the present
study, reservation wages are endogenous and strictly below the unemployment benefit. This is because the state
of employment is additionally valuable to workers due to the possibility to form and maintain their social contacts.
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useful since ties with no strength offer no incentive for exchange”.
Next, this paper performs a theoretical Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition of wage differentials
between workers finding jobs in a formal and an informal way. For a given level of productivity,
jobs obtained through social networks pay higher wages due to the better outside opportunities
of connected workers. Nevertheless, workers finding jobs through social contacts are more likely
to be employed in low productivity jobs, this is the selection effect. Combining the two effects,
this paper shows that wage penalties (premiums) associated with referrals are more likely to
be observed in labour markets with stronger (weaker) productivity heterogeneity of employers.
From another perspective, wage penalties (premiums) are more likely when the bargaining power
of workers is high (low). Intuitively, the sensitivity of wages to outside opportunities is decreasing
in the bargaining power, so that workers’ reservation wages have a strong impact on earnings if
the bargaining power is low. In contrast, the sensitivity of wages to productivity is increasing in
the strength of bargaining so that differences in productivities are more likely to be translated
into wages when the bargaining power is high.
Finally, and somewhat contradictory to the traditional view (see Montgomery (1991)), this
paper illustrates that social networks may reduce wage inequality in the economy. Note that this
prediction is obtained in the second information regime when homogeneous workers help each
other climb the wage ladder. Intuitively, more successful workers pool their less successful con-
tacts towards better paid jobs in the middle range of the productivity distribution. Therefore,
jobs with lowest productivity values are not stable and there are less of them in the stationary
steady-state. At the same time, most productive jobs are not frequently transferred through
social contacts, so the relative fraction of workers employed in these jobs is decreasing given the
overall rise in employment. Together, these two effects imply that social contacts reduce the
probability mass in the tails of the distribution by intensifying the process of on-the-job search,
so the variance of the equilibrium earnings distribution is reduced.
Related literature
This study is closely related to the literature on social networks in the labour market. The
seminal contribution in this field is Montgomery (1991), who shows that employee referrals may
serve as a useful screening device if worker’s ability is not observed by the potential employer.
In the setup of Montgomery workers are more likely to form social links with other workers of
the same ability type. As a result firms hire through referrals only if their current employee
is of a high-ability type, therefore, referral wages are higher than the average market wage.
The key difference of Montgomery (1991) relative to the present study is that firms are ex-ante
homogeneous. The advantage of this approach is the possibility of accounting for a positive
selection of workers by ability, however, the disadvantage is that the model does not explain
selection of referred workers to specific occupations or industries.
In a search theory framework, the positive effect of social contacts on wages is also emphasized
by Kugler (2003) and Galenianos (2011). In the former study referrals lower monitoring costs
for firms because high-effort referees can exert peer pressure on co-workers, allowing firms to
pay lower efficiency wages. Consequently, firms and workers with large networks prefer to use
referrals, while others are better off using formal methods. Hence, referrals are used to match
well-paid jobs to workers with high social capital and many contacts. However, the critical
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assumption of the model is that workers use either formal methods or social networks. This is
different in the present study where both search methods are used simultaneously.
The negative effect of referrals on wages is investigated in Bentolila, Michelacci and Suarez
(2008). Both workers and firms are heterogeneous in their model, as a result social contacts
can generate a mismatch between the occupational choice of the worker and his/her productive
advantage. Intuitively, if a worker is facing difficulties in finding a job, friends and relatives may
help this worker find a job in another sector. This has a negative effect on wages, since the
worker loses the productivity advantage by changing the sector. Horvath (2011) extends this
result by parameterizing the level of homophily in the society. It is then possible to show that
there exists a critical homophily value, such that if the homophily is sufficiently large (small),
the presence of social networks decreases (increases) the mismatch compared to a pure market
economy. This result is similar to the present study where social contacts can have a positive
and a negative effect on wages depending on the characteristics of the labour market. However,
the underlying mechanism for penalties and premiums in wages is different. When searching on-
the-job workers choose between accepting a job and forwarding it to a friend. This means that
referral offers are disproportionately selected from the left tail of the productivity distribution.
In contrast, none of the above studies considers the model with on-the-job search.
Further, there are several other studies that can simultaneously generate premiums and
penalties in referral wages, they are Sylos-Labini (2004), Pelizzari (2010), Tumen (2012) and
Zaharieva (2012). Sylos-Labini (2004) extends the original approach by Montgomery (1991)
and distinguishes between family and professional contacts. By assumption there is positive
correlation in the ability of professional ties, but there is zero correlation in the ability of family
members. As a result, the use of family contacts is likely to have a negative effect on wages, while
the opposite is true for professional ties. Family connections are also considered in Zaharieva
(2012). In this companion paper firms post wage offers in the regular market, but alternatively
they can save on advertising costs and rely on word-of-mouth communication. Wages are then
negotiated ex-post between the firm and the applicant and can deviate from the posted market
wage depending on the strength of the applicant’s bargaining position.
Tumen (2012) considers a population of workers heterogeneous with respect to the cost of
maintaining connections. In his model well integrated workers with low costs have higher reser-
vation wages and are able to bargain higher wages. Conversely, workers with higher costs accept
wages below the market level. Other related studies in the field of search theory include Fontaine
(2004, 2007, 2008). Fontaine (2004) considers the issue of social contacts from the perspective
of firms. In his study firms benefit from the social capital of their employees. Bargaining over
wages then implies that wages are increasing in the efficiency of networks. Fontaine (2007)
applies a similar model to a labour market with two heterogeneous groups of workers. As a
result he shows that an economy where more individuals have access to social networks does not
necessarily lead to a lower aggregate unemployment rate.
The model by Fontaine (2008) is most closely related to the present study. In that model
workers are endogenously differentiated depending on the number of employees in their network.
This in turn gives rise to the equilibrium wage dispersion and higher referral wages. Ioannides
and Soetevent (2006) support this result by showing that better connected workers experience
lower unemployment rates and receive higher wages. My model also has this feature for a given
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level of productivity. However, in my study endogenous wage dispersion is combined with an
exogenous productivity heterogeneity of firms. The advantage of this approach is a possibility
to investigate economic factors that lead to penalties or premiums in referral wages.
In a graph theory framework, social networks are analyzed by Calvo-Armengol and Jackson
(2004, 2007). The focus of their studies is on differences in the drop-out rates between two
exogenous groups of workers (blacks and whites). Calvo-Armengol and Jackson (2007) show
that a group of workers with worse initial network connections has higher drop-out rates and
persistently lower wages. Further, this study implicitly accounts for the possibility of on-the-job
search. In particular, in their model agents are more likely to pass information on if they are more
satisfied with their own position. However, the implications of this effect for the steady-state
earnings distribution are not considered in their studies, and therefore the negative selection
effect of social contacts on wages is not identified.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 explains notation and the general economic
environment. Section 3 presents a reduced intuitive version of the model with endogenous wages,
on-the-job search and a binary productivity distribution. In section 4 the model is extended to
account for any finite number of productivity values. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 The theoretical framework
This section describes the setup of the labour market. There is a continuum of infinitely lived risk
neutral workers and firms discounting future at a common discount rate r. The total measure
of ex-ante identical workers is normalized to one. Firms are heterogeneous with an exogenous
discrete productivity distribution F (yi) = P{y ≤ yi}, i = 1, .., n, where F (yn) = 1. Unemployed
workers obtain public unemployment insurance z, such that z < y1.
Job matching Matching between workers and firms is random and employed workers con-
tinue searching on-the-job. Both employed and unemployed workers obtain job offers with a
Poisson arrival rate λ. Upon the match workers observe the productivity of the job yi and
accept jobs with a positive value gain. Existing jobs are destroyed with a job destruction rate δ.
Social matching Workers employed in the same productivity sector yi can form social
contacts. In this paper I restrict attention to at most one social contact per worker at a given
moment of time. So the economy is simultaneously populated by single individuals (monads) and
connected two-person groups (dyads). Social matching is modelled using a matching function
approach. Let ei0 denote the measure of monads employed in firms with a productivity level yi.
Then m(ei0) = φe
i
0 denotes the total measure of new dyads with productivity yi per unit time.
This means that 2φ = 2m(ei0)/e
i
0 is the Poisson intensity parameter of social matching. Note
that the special case φ = 0 corresponds to the benchmark economy without dyads.
After the dyad was formed, both workers continue searching on-the-job or may lose their
jobs at rate δ. Therefore, all dyads in the economy can be split into three mutually exclusive
categories: employed, mixed or unemployed. The total measure of dyads in each category is
denoted by de, dm and du, respectively. In addition, let e0 and u0 denote the total measures of
employed and unemployed monads, where e0 =
∑n
i=1 e
i
0, then it holds:
2(de + dm + du) + e0 + u0 = 1
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and the overall unemployment rate u in the economy is given by u = 2du + dm + u0.
If both workers in a dyad are unemployed, their contact is subject to the risk of dissolution.
Let α denote the separation rate of an individual worker, so that 2α is the dissolution rate of a
dyad. Note that a higher value of α is associated with a shorter duration and higher instability
of social contacts. In addition, the special case α = 0 corresponds to a labour market with
permanent social contacts, which can be interpreted as strong family ties. The intermediate
situation with α > 0 and φ > 0 can then be treated as an economy with weak ties, where social
contacts are formed on a temporary basis.
Information structure According to the above description social contacts are formed
within the same production sector yi. However, future productivity and income changes of
workers are not observed by their dyad partners. Further, I distinguish between two information
regimes. In a first regime, workers observe changes in the employment status of their partners.
Moreover, job offers are only forwarded in order to help the unemployed dyad partner find a job.
Next, in a second information regime, the model is extended to allow workers to help each other
find a better paid job. At the same time, to keep the model tractable, in the second information
regime I assume that unemployment insurance is provided in the form of a public job, so that
unemployed workers are formally employed in a job paying the flow income z. This simplifies
the model since wage and employment status are private information of the worker.
Clearly, personal contacts lead to ex-post endogenous hetegogeneity of workers by social
capital, nevertheless in a second regime unobserved information reduces the number of social
types to only two groups – with high and low social capital – depending on the existence of a
dyad partner. Two workers connected in a dyad may exchange relevant job information and
help each other find a (better) job, so these workers’ social capital is high, leading to higher
endogenous reservation wages. This option is not available to single workers (monads), so their
social capital and reservation wages are low.
Wage determination Wages are determined via the concept of Nash-bargaining. This
means that wage wi is increasing in the productivity of the job yi and the reservation wage
of the worker. In addition, labour contracts are continuously renegotiated. On the one hand,
it means that changes in the reservation wage of the worker are immediately reflected in the
wage. In particular, new social contacts lead to higher reservation wages and higher wages, so
that workers with longer tenures are also more likely to receive higher wages. On the other
hand, continuous wage renegotiation guarantees that two workers with the same productivity
and social capital are paid the same wage independent of their previous employment states.
Optimal strategies Consider a worker with high social capital employed at wage wi with
a corresponding productivity yi. At a job-finding rate λpij = λ(Fj −Fj−1) this worker obtains a
new job offer with a productivity level yj . If yj > yi Nash bargaining with a new employer would
lead to a higher wage wj > wi, so there is a positive value gain for the worker associated with
a new job and the job quit is optimal. If yj < yi the new job is not valuable for the worker and
the offer can be redirected to the dyad partner. If the dyad partner is unemployed or employed
with a productivity level below yj , the job offer will be accepted, otherwise it is lost.
Moreover, in a second information regime it is always optimal for unemployed workers to
accept even the least productive job y1 > z. This is due to the fact that reservation wages
of unemployed workers are strictly below the unemployment benefit z. Intuitively, the state
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of employment is additionally valuable for workers due to the possibility to acquire new social
contacts. Also the probability of maintaining existing contacts is higher when the worker is
employed. This result is an extension of Burdett and Mortensen (1998) who prove that worker’s
reservation wage is exactly equal to the unemployment benefit if on-the-job search has the same
efficiency as off-the-job search. Although this requirement is satisfied in the model, reservation
wages of workers are below z due to the presence of network effects.
3 Special case n = 2: binary productivity distribution
This section investigates the effect of personal contacts on unemployment and wages in a special
case n = 2, corresponding to the binary productivity distribution. To ease the notation let
pi = F (y1) denote the fraction of jobs with a low productivity value y1, so that:
Productivity =
{
y2 with probability (1− pi)
y1 with probability pi
Consider the pool of employees. On the one hand, employees always accept job offers from more
productive firms y2, on the other hand, they redirect job offers in the low productivity sector y1
to their contacts. The reason is that jobs y1 are not valuable for the employees and can only be
strictly gainful for the unemployed workers. On the contrary, job offers in the high productivity
sector y2 are (weakly) valuable for all workers. Note that this setup implies that only the low
productivity jobs y1 are transferred through social contacts.
3.1 Aggregate variables
The structure of the labour market with a binary productivity distribution is illustrated on figure
1. Here black and red arrows indicate the processes of job creation and job destruction. Light
blue arrows correspond to the process of social matching: formation and dissolution of social
contacts. Blue arrows reflect transitions to better paid jobs, this is the result of on-the-job search,
while green arrows indicate job search through personal contacts. Variables U˜ and U denote
the asset values of unemployment for workers with high and low social capital, respectively. In
addition, variables V˜i and Vi denote asset values of employment in sector i, i = 1, 2, similarly
for the two levels of social capital.
Consider changes in the total measure of employed monads e˙0 with the asset values denoted
by V1 and V2. Employed monads lose jobs at rate δ and form social contacts at rate 2φ, so the
total outflow of workers from this group is (δ + 2φ)e0. At the same time unemployed monads
with an asset value denoted by U find jobs at rate λ, so the inflow of workers into this group
is λu0. Similarly, the inflow of workers into the state u0 is δe0 + 2α · 2du stemming from the
dissolution of dyads at the instability rate 2α when both dyad partners are unemployed. This
reasoning gives rise to the following differential equations for variables u˙0 and e˙0:
u˙0 = 4αdu − λu0 + δe0 e˙0 = λu0 − δe0 − 2φe0
Next consider changes in the total measure of unemployed dyads du where the asset value of
each dyad partner is denoted by U˜ . Employed partners in mixed dyads dm lose jobs at rate δ,
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Figure 1: The structure of the labour market
so the inflow of dyads into this state is δdm. At the same time every partner in the unemployed
dyad finds a job at rate λ, so the outflow of dyads from du is 2λdu+2αdu. Similarly unemployed
workers in mixed dyads find jobs at rate λ or may obtain job offers from their partners. Since only
low paid jobs are transferred through social contacts the rate at which connected unemployed
workers find jobs through personal contacts is λpi, so the total inflow of dyads into the state de
is equal to λdm + λpidm + φe0:
d˙u = δdm − 2αdu − 2λdu d˙e = λdm + λpidm − 2δde + φe0
In the steady state it should be true that u˙0 = 0, e˙0 = 0, d˙u = 0 and d˙e = 0, which also implies
d˙m = 0 due to the fixed total measure of workers in the economy. The steady state values u0,
e0, du and dm are described in lemma 1:
Lemma 1: Denote an additional auxilliary shift variable s = αδ(2φ + δ) + (δ + λ + α)λφ.
Then the equilibrium measures of unemployed and mixed dyads du, dm are given by:
du =
0.5δ2φλ
(λ+ δ)s+ λ2piφ(α+ λ)
dm =
δλ(λ+ α)φ
(λ+ δ)s+ λ2piφ(α+ λ)
The equilibrium measures of unemployed and employed monads u0 and e0 are given by:
u0 =
αδ2(2φ+ δ)
(λ+ δ)s+ λ2piφ(α+ λ)
e0 =
αδ2λ
(λ+ δ)s+ λ2piφ(α+ λ)
Job search through personal contacts has a negative effect on du, dm, e0 and u0, while it has a
positive effect on the measure of employed dyads de = 0.5(1− u0 − e0)− dm − du.
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Proof: Appendix I.
Lemma 1 shows that the second term in the common denominator λ2piφ(α+λ) is attributed
to network effects. This means that job search through personal contacts has a positive effect
on the total measure of dyads in the economy d = 1−u0− e0 and a similar positive effect on the
measure of employed dyads de. Personal contacts place more workers into jobs so the dissolution
of dyads is reduced. In addition consider the two bechmark cases α = 0 and φ = 0. In a purely
dyadic labour market when α = 0 variables du and dm simplify to yield:
du =
0.5δ2
(δ + λ)2 + λ2pi
dm =
δλ
(δ + λ)2 + λ2pi
In the absence of personal contacts these variables are further simplified to du = 0.5δ
2/(δ+ λ)2,
dm = δλ/(δ+λ)
2 and de = 0.5λ
2/(δ+λ)2 which is the case of independent job search, note that
the total measure of dyads in a dyadic economy is 0.5. In a monadic labour market when φ = 0
variables u0 and e0 simplify to δ/(λ+ δ) and λ/(λ+ δ) respectively. So the model developed in
this paper has a general character and nests a number of benchmark search models.
Informal job search through contacts also has a negative effect on the aggregate unemploy-
ment rate in the economy:
u = u0 + 2du + dm =
δs
(λ+ δ)s+ λ2piφ(α+ λ)
<
δ
λ+ δ
The stronger the effect of personal contacts λ2piφ(α+λ) the lower is the equilibrium unemploy-
ment. In particular, unemployment is decreasing in the proportion of low productivity jobs pi
since only these jobs are transferred in the informal way. This means that the unemployment
rate achieves the minimum for the case pi = 1 – an economy without productivity heterogeneity.
3.2 Equilibrium productivity distribution
Let variables p1 = e
1
0/e and p2 = e
2
0/e denote the equilibrium measures of monads employed
at productivities y1 and y2 respectively and expressed as a proportion of total employment e.
Monads are the unconnected workers with a low level of social capital. In addition, let variables
p˜1 and p˜2 denote the equilibrium proportions of employees with a high level of social capital
employed at productivities y1 and y2, so that p1 + p2 + p˜1 + p˜2 = 1. Table 1 summarises
the population structure of the economy reflecting an exogenous heterogeneity of workers by
productivity and an endogenous heterogeneity by social capital. The corresponding wages are
denoted by wi and w˜i, i = 1, 2.
Low productivity High productivity
y1, p(y1) y2, p(y2)
Low social capital w1, p1 w2, p2
High social capital w˜1, p˜1 w˜2, p˜2
Table 1: Wages and productivities by groups of workers
Variables p(y1) = p1 + p˜1 and p(y2) = p2 + p˜2, such that p(y1) + p(y2) = 1, show the
total fractions of workers employed in sectors y1 and y2 – this is the equilibrium productivity
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distribution in the economy. The equilibrium values p(y1) and p(y2) are provided by lemma 2:
Lemma 2: Let variables p1 and p2 denote proportions of monads employed at productivities
y1 and y2. The equilibrium values p1 = e
1
0/e and p2 = e
2
0/e are given by:
p1 =
piαδ2(2φ+ δ)
(2φ+ δ + λ(1− pi))(s+ λpiφ(α+ λ))
p2 =
(1− pi)αδ2(2φ+ δ + λ)
(2φ+ δ + λ(1− pi))(s+ λpiφ(α+ λ))
The equilibrium productivity distribution {p(y1), p(y2)} is given by:
p(y1) =
piδ
δ + λ(1− pi)
[
1 +
λ(1− pi)φ(α+ λ)
s+ λpiφ(α+ λ)
]
p(y2) =
(1− pi)
δ + λ(1− pi)
[
λ+
δs
s+ λpiφ(α+ λ)
]
Informal job search has a positive effect on p(y1) and a negative effect on p(y2).
Proof: Appendix I.
Lemma 2 proves that network effects shift the equilibrium productivity distribution towards
low paid jobs, this is intuitive, since only low paid jobs are transferred through personal contacts.
The equilibrium productivity distribution with personal contacts and information exchange is
then stochastically dominated by the distribution without contacts:
p(y1) >
piδ
δ + λ(1− pi)
p(y2) <
(1− pi)(λ+ δ)
δ + λ(1− pi)
for φ > 0
Section 4 further shows that this result persists in the extended model with an arbitrary finite
number of productivity values. Indeed, low paid jobs are more likely to be transferred through
social contacts which shifts the probability mass of the equilibrium productivity distribution to
the left. This is the central explanation of the negative effect of referrals on wages in this paper.
3.3 Asset values and wages
In the second information regime, unobserved information with respect to the flow income of dyad
partners implies that connected workers have to form probabilistic beliefs about the employment
status and wages of their contacts. Consider an unemployed worker and let variable µ denote an
equilibrium probability that the dyad partner of this worker is also unemployed. The measure
of unemployed dyads in the economy is du, while the measure of mixed dyads where the first
partner is unemployed and the second one is employed is 0.5dm. For variable µ this means:
µ =
du
du + 0.5dm
=
δ
δ + λ+ α
If the dyad partner of the unemployed worker is also unemployed (with probability µ), the social
contact can be destroyed at the dissolution rate 2α. On the contrary, if the dyad partner is
employed (with probability 1−µ) the social contact persists and there is an additional value for
the worker from the possibility of obtaining a new job offer from the partner. Asset values of
unemployed workers with high and low social capital are then given by:
rU = z + λpi(V1 − U) + λ(1− pi)(V2 − U)
rU˜ = z + λpi(2− µ)(V˜1 − U˜) + λ(1− pi)(V˜2 − U˜)− 2µα(U˜ − U)
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and the asset values of employees searching on-the-job and forming contacts are:
rV1 = w1 + λ(1− pi)(V2 − V1) + 2φ(V˜1 − V1)− δ(V1 − U)
rV˜1 = w˜1 + λ(1− pi)(V˜2 − V˜1)− δ(V˜1 − U˜)
rV2 = w2 + 2φ(V˜2 − V2)− δ(V2 − U) and rV˜2 = w˜2 − δ(V˜2 − U˜)
Asset values for filled jobs are denoted by variables J˜i and Ji, i = 1, 2. Wage renegotiation
implies that wages are simultaneously updated if the outside option of the worker is changed.
This means that firms hiring workers at low wages w1 and w2 will have to pay higher wages w˜1
and w˜2 respectively at rate 2φ when the social capital of the worker is increased. Here note that
workers with longer tenures on average earn higher wages than workers with shorter tenures,
which is in line with the empirical evidence. Asset values for filled jobs are given by:
rJi = yi − wi − λ(1− pi)Ji − 2φ(Ji − J˜i)− δJi, i = 1, 2
rJ˜i = yi − w˜i − λ(1− pi)J˜i − δJ˜i, i = 1, 2
Every job destroyed at rate δ exits the market and is substituted by a new vacant one with
the same productivity level, so the total measure of filled and vacant jobs remains unchanged.
Worker rents Ri ≡ Vi − U and R˜i ≡ V˜i − U˜ can be expressed as:
(r + δ + λ(1− pi) + 2φ)Ri = wi − rU + λ(1− pi)R2 + 2φ(R˜i +∆U)
(r + δ + λ(1− pi))R˜i = w˜i − rU˜ + λ(1− pi)R˜2
where ∆U ≡ U˜ − U is the unemployed worker’s value gain from having a dyad partner; this is
the endogenous value of social capital in the model. Worker rents R1 and R˜1 associated with
jobs in the low productivity sector can be rewritten by inserting variables rU and rU˜ :
(r + δ + λ+ 2φ)R1 = w1 − z + 2φ(R˜1 +∆U)
(r + δ + λ+ λpi(1− µ))R˜1 = w˜1 − z + 2µα∆U
In the following it will be shown that variable ∆U is strictly positive, so that reservation wages
of both types of workers are below the unemployment benefit z. This means that workers never
reject jobs in the low productivity sector, since y1 > z. There are two distinct reasons for ac-
cepting these jobs: unemployed workers without contacts accept a job paying potentially less
than z due to the additional probability of forming social contacts when employed. McDonald
(2011: 1673) provides empirical evidence and summarizes this idea by writing that ”specializa-
tion in work can increase a person’s social capital as time spent in related occupations increases
the opportunity to meet and develop relationships with the kinds of contacts that can provide
unsolicited information about future job openings”. In addition, connected unemployed workers
are willing to accept low productivity jobs in order to eliminate the probability of losing their
existing social contacts.
Let 0 < β < 1 denote the bargaining power of workers. Wages are then obtained via the
mechanism of Nash bargaining, where the β-fraction of the total job surplus accrues to workers:
12
Ri = β(Ri + Ji) and R˜i = β(R˜i + J˜i). This gives the following equilibrium equations for wages:
wi = β(yi + 2φJ˜i) + (1− β)[rU − λ(1− pi)R2 − 2φ(R˜i +∆U)]
= βyi + (1− β)[z + λpiR1 − 2φ∆U ]
w˜i = βyi + (1− β)[rU˜ − λ(1− pi)R˜2]
= βyi + (1− β)[z + λpi(2− µ)R˜1 − 2µα∆U ]
These equations show that differences in wages can be decomposed into two parts resulting from
worker and firm heterogeneity. Inter-sectoral wage differentials are the same for both types of
workers and reflect exogenous productivity differences between the sectors: w˜2−w˜1 = w2−w1 =
β∆y where ∆y ≡ y2− y1. In addition, wages are heterogeneous within the sector, so that intra-
sectoral wage differentials are attributed to differences in the reservation wages of workers:
∆w ≡ w˜1 − w1 = w˜2 − w2
= (1− β)[λpi((2− µ)R˜1 −R1)− 2∆U(µα− φ)]
In the following consider the limiting case r → 0 and denote an auxilliary variable σ = µα(δ +
2φ+ λ(1− pi)(1− β)) + φλβ. Proposition 1 shows that intra-sectoral wage differentials ∆w are
proportional to the value of social capital ∆U :
Proposition 1:Wage gap ∆w = w˜1 − w1 = w˜2 − w2 attributed to differences in the social
capital of unemployed workers is given by:
∆w =
(1− β)(δ + 2φ+ λ(1− pi))φ
δ + 2φ+ λ(1− pi)(1− β)
2∆U
=
λpiβ(1− β)(1− µ)(δ + 2φ+ λ(1− pi))φ
σ(δ + λ(1− pi) + λpiβ) + λpiβ(1− µ)φλβ
(y1 − z)
Moreover, ∆w is a decreasing function of the instability parameter α and an increasing function
of the intensity parameter φ:
∂∆U
∂α
< 0
∂∆w
∂α
< 0
∂∆w
∂φ
> 0
∂∆U
∂φ
< 0
Proof: Appendix II.
Proposition 1 shows that endogenous wage dispersion ∆w disappears if y1 = z, β = 0 or
β = 1. If y1 = z low paid jobs are not valuable for workers, so the value of social capital ∆U
is equal to zero. This means that reservation wages of both types of workers are the same and
equal to z. This is a standard result in a model with on-the-job search. The same is true if
β = 0. On the contrary, if β = 1 wages are equal to the productivity of jobs: wi = w˜i = yi, so
that differences in the reservation wages are not reflected in wages.
The second group of results from proposition 1 can be explained in the following way. Higher
α leads to lower stability and therefore shorter average durations of social contacts, this con-
tributes to a lower value of social capital ∆U . Short-term social contacts are less valuable, so
that differences in the reservation wages of workers are reduced. Lin (1999: 482) describes this
effect by writing that ”the weakest ties are clearly not useful since ties with no strength offer no
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incentive for exchange”. The implications of higher φ are similar: social contacts are formed at
a higher rate, so the gain from social contacts ∆U is lower. Nevertheless, ∆w is higher due to
the dominating effect of a higher probability of forming the link.
3.4 Implications of social contacts
What is the average wage paid to workers finding jobs through personal contacts? The answer
to this question is w˜1 – this is the only wage paid to connected workers in the low productivity
sector y1. Further, let w
n denote the average wage paid to workers finding jobs in a formal way,
and w¯ – the average wage between the two groups. Clearly, w¯ is also the average wage in the
economy, so that:
w¯ = w1p1 + w2p2 + w˜2p˜2 + (1− p1 − p2 − p˜2)w˜1
This means that the ex-post effect of personal contacts on wages w˜1 −w
n is positive (negative)
if w˜1 − w¯ is positive (negative). Therefore, in the following only the term w˜1 − w¯ is considered
and it can be decomposed into a positive and a negative part 3:
w˜1 − w¯ = (w˜1 − w1)p1 + (w˜1 − w2)p2 + (w˜1 − w˜2)p˜2
= ∆wp1 + (∆w + w1 − w2)p2 − β∆yp˜2
= ∆w(p1 + p2)− β∆y(p2 + p˜2)
Proposition 2: The effect of personal contacts on wages is positive (w˜1 − w¯ > 0) in the
absence of productivity heterogeneity meaning that ∆y = 0 or pi = 1, while this effect is negative
(w˜1 − w¯ < 0) in a dyadic economy (α = 0), if low productivity jobs are not productive (y1 = z)
or if workers possess the full bargaining power (β = 1).
w˜1 − w¯ =
αδ2∆w
s+ λpiφ(α+ λ)
−
(1− pi)β∆y
δ + λ(1− pi)
[
λ+
δs
s+ λpiφ(α+ λ)
]
Moreover, the effect of personal contacts on wages is negative for pi ∈ (0, pi∗), where the unique
threshold value pi∗ can be obtained from:
λpi∗φ(α+ λ)αµδ
s(λ+ δ) + λ2pi∗φ(α+ λ)
=
y2 − y1
y1 − z
(1− pi∗)
The threshold value pi∗ is a decreasing function of parameters φ, α and y1 but an increasing
function of y2 and z. Proof: Appendix III.
The positive effect of personal contacts is explained by the higher reservation wage of con-
nected workers leading to endogenous wage dispersion ∆w. In the absence of productivity
heterogeneity (∆y = 0 or pi = 1) all jobs in the economy are equally productive and there is no
distinction between the two sectors. The number of wages in this economy is reduced to only
two: w˜ > w, so that workers finding jobs through personal contacts are paid higher wages than
workers finding jobs in the formal way.
3This step is similar to the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition of differences in wages between two heterogeneous
groups of workers. The two parts are called the price and the endownment effects.
14
The negative effect of personal contacts is stronger with a higher productivity heterogeneity:
higher ∆y and lower pi. This is intuitive since dyad partners only help find jobs in the low
productivity sector y1. Consider the case α = 0 corresponding to the dyadic labour market
with strong ties. Every worker in this economy is connected to a permanent dyad partner and
hence there are no differences in the reservation wages of workers. The number of wages in this
economy is again reduced to only two: w2 > w1, so that workers finding jobs through personal
contacts are paid lower wages than workers finding jobs in the formal way.
Moreover, proposition 2 defines a unique threshold value of the probability parameter pi∗,
such that the negative effect of referrals is dominating for every β < 1 if the proportion of low
paid jobs is sufficiently small: pi < pi∗. This is illustrated on figure 2. In the opposite case pi > pi∗
the effect of personal contacts can be both positive and negative depending on the parameter of
bargaining power. This is due to the fact that wage dispersion ∆w is a non-linear function of
β, in particular ∆w = 0 if β = 0 or β = 1 reaching maximum at the interior value of β. This
gives rise to proposition 3.
Proposition 3: Denote an auxilliary function ∆W (β) = ∆w/β, such that ∆W ′(β) < 0, and
consider the case pi∗ < pi < 1, then there exists a unique threshold value β∗ such that the effect
of personal contacts on wages (w˜1 − w¯) is positive if β ∈ (0, β
∗) and it is negative if β ∈ (β∗, 1],
the threshold value β∗ can be obtained from:
∆y
(p2 + p˜2)
(p1 + p2)
= ∆W (β∗)
The effect of personal contacts on wages is zero if either β = 0 or β = β∗.
Proof: Appendix III.
β
w˜1 − w¯
0
1
pi ≤ pi∗
pi∗ < pi < 1
pi = 1
β∗
Figure 2: The ex-post effect of referrals on wages
Proposition 3 and figure 2 show that the negative effect of personal contacts on wages is domi-
nating for large values of the bargaining power parameter β > β∗. This is due to the fact that
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wages are proportional to the productivity, so the negative effect of personal contacts is a linear
function of β, reaching the lowest value for β = 1. In addition, the positive effect of reservation
wages ∆w is small for β → 1, so the negative effect is dominating. On the contrary, the positive
effect is large for interior values of β and is dominating for β < β∗.
4 General case: n > 2 with exogenous wages
This section explores properties of the labour market with a finite number of productivity values
n > 2 and shows that the negative effect of personal contacts on wages is an inherent feature
of the process of on-the-job search. However, in order to keep the model tractable I impose a
simplifying assumption of a binding minimum wage requirement. Without loss of generality I
assume that the legal minimum wage in the economy is set to z, this means that wage equations
are simplified to yield: wi = βyi+(1−β)z. Therefore, the focus of this section is on the negative
selection effect of social networks and the traditional (positive) effect of reservation wages on
earnings is not considered.
4.1 Aggregate variables
Probability variables Fi = P{y ≤ yi} define a cumulative density function of the productivity
distribution yi, i = 1, .., n, with a density function pii = Fi − Fi−1. In addition let hi define a
measure of mixed dyads where the first worker is unemployed and the second is employed at
productivity yi. The corresponding cumulative measure of mixed dyads is denoted by Hi, so that
Hn = 0.5dm. Similarly, let gij denote a measure of employed dyads where workers are employed
at productivities yi and yj respectively. Finally let Gij denote the corresponding cumulative
measure of employed dyads so that Gnn = de.
As a first step in the analysis consider the case when the employment status of the worker
is observed by the dyad partner and social connections are only used to help unemployed dyad
partners find a job (first information regime). In section 4.3 the model will be extended to allow
employed workers to use connections in order to find a better paid job4. Changes in the stock
of mixed dyads where the second worker is employed at a productivity less or equal to yk can
be described by the following differential equation:
H˙k = λFkdu + δGn,k − δHk − λ(1− Fk)Hk − λHk −λ
k∑
i=1
Fihi︸ ︷︷ ︸
network effects
(4.1)
Unemployed workers find jobs with a productivity less or equal to yk at rate λFk. In addition,
workers with dyad partners employed at a productivity less or equal to yk lose jobs at rate δ
and the total measure of these dyads is Gnk, so the total inflow of dyads into the state Hk
is λFkdu + δGnk. Employed workers in mixed dyads lose jobs at rate δ or find a job with a
4In a setting when the transmission of job information is conditional on the employment status of the dyad
partner, reservation wages of unemployed workers may be situated abobe z, so that low paid jobs y1 can be
rejected if y1 − z is sufficiently small. However this setting is treated as a first step to the extended model where
the transmission of job information is unconditional, in this extended model low productivity jobs y1 > z are
never rejected and so the issue of reservation wages is not discussed in this section.
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productivity strictly higher than yk at rate λ(1 − Fk), so the first part of the outflow of mixed
dyads is δHk + λ(1 − Fk)Hk. Unemployed partners in mixed dyads find jobs in a formal way
at rate λ or can obtain an offer in the informal way from their partners. Note that employed
workers in mixed dyads hi forward jobs to their partners with a probability λFi. This explains
the second part of the outflow of mixed dyads λHk + λ
∑k
i=1 Fihi.
Next denote Qk the measure of monads in the economy employed at a productivity less or
equal to yk, formally Qk =
∑k
i=1 e
0
i , so that Qn = e0. These monads form social contacts at
rate φ, so that changes in the stock of employed dyads Glk are given by:
G˙lk = λFlHk + λFkHl − 2δGlk − λ(1− Fk)Glk − λ(1− Fl)Glk + (4.2)
+ φQk + 2λ
k∑
i=1
Fihi + λFk(Hl −Hk)︸ ︷︷ ︸
network effects
if l ≥ k
The total measure of mixed dyads where the first worker is employed in the range between yk
and yl (l ≥ k) is equal to Hl − Hk. Employed workers in these dyads forward jobs with a
productivity below yk to their dyad partners and these jobs are offered with an arrival rate λFk.
So the additional inflow of dyads into the stock Glk which is attributed to job search through
personal contacts is equal to 2λ
∑k
i=1 Fihi + λFk(Hl −Hk).
Transform the measures of mixed dyads hi and Hi into the proper probability distribution
h˜i = hi/(0.5dm) and H˜i = Hi/(0.5dm), so that
∑n
i=1 h˜i = 1. In the stationary equilibrium
variables G˙nn and H˙n should be equal to zero, this gives rise to lemma 3.
Lemma 3: Let Fi = P{y ≤ yi}, i = 1, .., n denote a cumulative density function of the
productivity distribution yi, i = 1, .., n and let F¯ denote an average probability: F¯ =
∑n
i=1 Fih˜i.
The equilibrium measures of unemployed and mixed dyads du, dm are:
du =
0.5δ2φλ
(λ+ δ)s+ λ2F¯ φ(α+ λ)
dm =
δλ(λ+ α)φ
(λ+ δ)s+ λ2F¯ φ(α+ λ)
The equilibrium measures of unemployed and employed monads u0 and e0 are given by:
u0 =
αδ2(2φ+ δ)
(λ+ δ)s+ λ2F¯ φ(α+ λ)
e0 =
αδ2λ
(λ+ δ)s+ λ2F¯ φ(α+ λ)
Job search through personal contacts has a negative effect on du, dm, e0 and u0, while it has a
positive effect on the number of employed dyads de = 0.5(1− u0 − e0)− dm − du.
Lemma 3 is an extended version of lemma 1 for the general case of a finite-state productivity
distribution yi, i = 1, .., n. The intuitive interpretation of the results is also similar: personal
contacts increase the measure of employed dyads de and have a negative effect on the equilibrium
unemployment rate.
4.2 Equilibrium productivity distribution
This section analyses properties of the equilibrium productivity distribution in an economy with
n > 2 production sectors, on-the-job search and personal contacts. First consider the effect of
social contacts on the productivity distribution of mixed dyads h˜i and H˜i. Table 2 shows that
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the new outflow of workers from state h1 (which is attributed to network effects) is λF1h1. This
ouflow reflects the fact that connected workers employed at productivity y1 obtain job offers
in the same production sector at rate λF1 and forward these offers to the unemployed dyad
partners. This additional exit rate is however increasing from λF1 to λFn = λ with a higher
productivity level. Indeed, connected workers employed at a maximum productivity yn will
forward any new job offer to their unemployed dyad partners.
e1 e2 ... en−1 en e
h1 λpi1 0 ... 0 0 λF1
h2 λpi1 λpi2 ... 0 0 λF2
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
hn−1 λpi1 λpi2 ... λpin−1 0 λFn−1
hn λpi1 λpi2 ... λpin−1 λpin λFn
Hn λpi1Hn λpi2(Hn −H1) ... λpin−1(Hn −Hn−2) λpin(Hn −Hn−1)
Table 2: Outflow of mixed dyads attributed to social contacts
This means that network effects have an asymmetric effect on the productivity distribution
of mixed dyads h˜i: the outflow of dyads is stronger in the right tale of the distribution and
it is weaker in the left tale. As a result the productivity distribution H˜i with network effects
is first order stochastically dominated by the distribution H˜∗i without network effects. This is
summarized in proposition 3.
Proposition 3: Let H˜k denote a cumulative density function of an equilibrium productivity
distribution of mixed dyads. H˜k is given by the following recursive equation:
H˜k =
λδFk(2(δ + α+ λ) + λ(1− Fk))
(α+ λ)(δ + λ(1− Fk))2(δ + λ)
+
δQ˜k + λ
2(1− Fk)
∑k−1
i=1 h˜i(Fk − Fi)
(δ + λ(1− Fk))2(δ + λ)
where Q˜k =
φQk
0.5dm
=
2αδFk(δ + 2φ)
(α+ λ)(δ + 2φ+ λ(1− Fk))
For ∀α ≥ 0 the productivity distribution H˜k with network effects is first order stochastically
dominated by the distribution H˜∗k without network effects, where the later is given by:
H˜∗k =
λδFk(2δ + α+ λ+ λ(1− Fk)) + δQ˜k(α+ λ)
(α+ λ)(δ + λ(1− Fk))(2δ + λ+ λ(1− Fk))
Proof: Appendix IV.
Proposition 3 proves that job search through personal contacts shifts the probability mass
of the distribution h˜i to the left, so the fraction of mixed dyads with workers employed in low
productivity sectors is disproportionately increased. In order to isolate this effect consider the
simplified case α = 0 corresponding to the dyadic labour market with strong ties. Without job
information exchange the distribution of mixed dyads is equal to H˜∗k = δFk/(δ + λ(1 − Fk))
which is a standard productivity distribution in a labour market with on-the-job search. With
personal contacts and job information exchange the productivity distribution H˜k is first order
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stochastically dominated by the distribution H˜∗k :
H˜k =
δFk
(δ + λ(1− Fk))
[
1 +
λ(1− Fk)
2(δ + λ)
]
+
λ2(1− Fk)
∑k−1
i=1 h˜i(Fk − Fi)
(δ + λ(1− Fk))2(δ + λ)
> H˜∗k
Next denote P (yk) a cumulative density function of the equilibrium productivity distribution,
which can be calculated as: P (yk) = Ek/e, where Ek =
∑k
i=1 ei is the total measure of workers
employed at a productivity below or equal to yk. Category Ek includes (1) employed dyads
where either of the two partners is employed at a productivity below or equal to yk, (2) mixed
dyads satisfying the same condition and (3) single monads with a corresponding measure Qk:
Ek = Gnk +Gkn + 2Hk +Qk
Table 2 shows that the new inflow of workers (attributed to personal contacts) into the employ-
ment state e1 is equal to λpi1
∑n
i=1 hi = λpi1Hn, where Hn = 0.5dm. This is explained by the
consideration that any employed connected worker will forward a job offer y1 to the unemployed
dyad partner. This inflow is however falling from λpi1Hn to λpin(Hn − Hn−1) = λpinhn with
a higher productivity level. Clearly, only workers employed at a maximum productivity level
yn will forward a job offer in the same production sector to their contacts. These results are
summarized in proposition 4.
Proposition 4: Let Fi = P{y ≤ yi}, i = 1, .., n denote a cumulative density function of the
productivity distribution yi, and let F¯ denote an average probability: F¯ =
∑n
i=1 Fih˜i. If workers
search on-the-job and forward job offers weakly below their current income to unemployed dyad
partners, the equilibrium productivity distribution P (yk) is given by:
P (yk) =
δFk
(δ + λ(1− Fk))
+
λδφ(λ+ α)[Fk(1− F¯ )−
∑k
i=1(Fk − Fi)h˜i]
(δ + λ(1− Fk))(s+ λφF¯ (α+ λ))
where
Fk(1− F¯ )−
k∑
i=1
(Fk − Fi)h˜i = Fk
n∑
i=k+1
(1− Fi)h˜i + (1− Fk)
k∑
i=1
Fih˜i > 0
For ∀α ≥ 0 the productivity distribution P (yk) with network effects is first order stochastically
dominated by the distribution P ∗(yk) = δFk/(δ + λ(1− Fk)) without network effects.
Proof: Appendix IV.
Proposition 4 implies that network effects also have an asymmetric effect on the equilibrium
productivity distribution p(yk) = ek/e: the inflow of workers is stronger in the left tale of
the distribution and it is weaker in the right tale. Figure 3 illustrates comparison between
the equilibrium productivity distribution p(yk) (blue line) and the distribution p
∗(yk) without
network effects (black line). In addition, the distribution of mixed dyads h˜i is illustrated by the
black dashed line.
In order to illustrate the effect of social networks I use the exponential distribution f(y) =
2.5e−2.5y. So the discretized probability values pii can be obtained as pik = f(yk)/
∑
i f(yi)
with a minimum productivity value y1 = 0.5 and a maximim productivity value y20 = 1.45.
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Figure 3: The initial productivity distribution is f(y) = 2.5e−2.5y, pik = f(yk)/
∑
i f(yi). The
parameters used are α = 0, λ = 0.5, δ = 0.2
Burdett and Mortensen (1998) prove that on-the-job search shifts the original productivity
distribution towards more productive jobs, so the equilibrium productivity density function
p∗(yk) = δ(δ+λ)pik/[(δ+λ(1−Fk))(δ+λ(1−Fk−1))] is hump-shaped with a unique maximum on
the distribution support. This is a joint impact of the downward-sloping exponential density pik
and the effect of on-the-job search. Further, referrals to unemployed workers have a counteracting
effect on the productivity density function, so there is more (less) probability mass in the left
(right) tail of the equilibrium distributions h˜k (dashed line) and p(yk) (blue line). This also
implies that personal contacts have a negative effect on the average wage. Let wc and wn denote
average wages in economies with and without personal contacts, respectively. These wages can
be calculated as follows:
wc − wn = β
n∑
i=1
yip(yi) + (1− β)z − β
n∑
i=1
yip
∗(yi)− (1− β)z
= β
n∑
i=1
(yi+1 − yi)(P
∗(yi)− P (yi)) < 0
which proves that the network effect on wages is negative when connected workers search on-
the-job and forward job offers below their current income to unemployed dyad partners.
4.3 On-the-job search with referrals to employees
This section extends the model to the case when employees forward job offers to their employed
social contacts. Therefore the strategy of the employee is to accept every offer above the current
wage and to forward every other offer to the dyad partner. Thus this strategy is independent
of the employment status of the partner. As a result employees in the economy are more likely
to change their jobs climbing up the wage ladder. Formally, consider the stock of employed
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dyads Glk, l > k. With a probability Fi − Fk workers employed in jobs with a productivity yi,
l ≥ i > k can help their contacts find a better paid job. For every i the total stock of these
dyads is gik = Gik − Gi−1k. Hence there is an additional outflow of dyads from the stock Glk,
l > k which is given by
∑l
i=k+1 gik(Fi − Fk). This means:
G˙lk = λFlHk + λFkHl − 2δGlk − λ(1− Fk)Glk − λ(1− Fl)Glk + (4.3)
+ 2λ
k∑
i=1
Fihi + λFk(Hl −Hk)︸ ︷︷ ︸
help unemployed
−λ
l∑
i=k+1
gik(Fi − Fk)︸ ︷︷ ︸
help employed
if l > k
The equilibrium productivity distribution P (yk) for the case when on-the-job search is combined
with referrals is characterised in proposition 5.
Proposition 5: Let Glk denote a cumulative density function of employed dyads, so that
glk = Glk − Gl−1k if l > k. Moreover, let G˜lk = Glk/0.5dm and g˜lk = glk/0.5dm. If workers
search on-the-job and forward job offers to their dyad partners (employed or unemployed) then
the cumulative density function of the equilibrium productivity distribution of mixed dyads H˜k is
given by the following system of linear equations:
H˜k =
δFk(2(δ + λ) + λ(1− Fk))
(δ + λ(1− Fk))2(δ + λ)
+
λ[λ(1− Fk)
∑k−1
i=1 h˜i(Fk − Fi)− δ
∑n
i=k+1 g˜ik(Fi − Fk)]
(δ + λ(1− Fk))2(δ + λ)
where g˜ik =
λfiH˜k + 2λFkh˜i + λfiG˜i−1k
2(δ + λ(1− Fk))
i > k and G˜kk =
λFkH˜k + λ
∑k
i=1 Fih˜i
δ + λ(1− Fk)
the equilibrium productivity distribution P (yk) is given by :
P (yk) =
δFk
(δ + λ(1− Fk))
+
λδ[Fk(1− F¯ )−
∑k
i=1(Fk − Fi)h˜i −
∑n
i=k+1 g˜ik(Fi − Fk)]
(δ + λ(1− Fk))(δ + λ(1 + F¯ ))
Proposition 5 shows that there is a negative and a positive effect of referrals on the equilibrium
productivity distribution p(yk). This is illustrated on figure 4. First, employees help their unem-
ployed social contacts find a job. This effect is captured by the term Fk(1−F¯ )−
∑k
i=1(Fk−Fi)h˜i >
0. As a result the probability mass of the distribution p(yk) shifts towards low productivity jobs
(solid blue line). Second, employees in more productive jobs (and higher wages) continue helping
their social contacts climb the wage ladder. In particular, they forward jobs in the middle range
of the distribution to their contacts employed in low paid jobs. This effect is captured by the
term
∑n
i=k+1 g˜ik(Fi − Fk) and shifts the probability mass of the distribution p(yk) towards the
center (dashed blue line). Overall, figure 4 illustrates that the second shift is dominating and
there is less probability mass in the left tail of the equilibrium distribution.
At the same time, note that most productive jobs are rearely transferred through social
contacts. This means that a large growth in the overall employment is dominating and the
relative proportion of workers employed in most productive jobs is reduced: P (yk) = Ek/e. As a
result there is less probability mass in the right tail of the equilibrium distribution. In summary,
the final effect of referrals is a larger probability mass in the middle range of the distribution
p(yk), this means that referrals intensify the process of on-the-job search so the variance of the
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distribution is reduced, but the effect on the average productivity is ambiguous.
Figure 4: The initial productivity distribution is f˜(yi) = 2.5e
−2.5yi , f(yi) = f˜(yi)/
∑
i f˜(yi).
The parameters used are α = 0, λ = 0.5, δ = 0.2
At this point it should be noted that the above result is somewhat in contrast with the tra-
ditional view. For example, Montgomery (1991) shows that a higher network density generates
greater dispersion of the equilibrium earnings distribution. However, the labour market environ-
ment analysed by Montgomery (1991) is different from the present study. First, workers in his
study are heterogeneous by ability and there is a problem of asymmetric information. Second,
the possibility of on-the-job search and firm heterogeneity are not considered. Consequently,
an increase in the network density generates more employee referrals, removing relatively more
high-ability workers from the market. As a result, the lemons effect is exacerbated and the
market wage falls. In this respect, it is a challenging task for future research to analyse the
effect of referrals on wage inequality in a labour market with heterogeneous workers and firms,
asymmetric information and on-the-job search.
4.4 Asset values and reservation wages
This section investigates the effect of personal contacts on reservation wages of unemployed
workers for the extended case n > 2. In addition, the focus of this section is on the second
information regime, when employees help their contacts find a (better paid) job. Specifically, this
section shows that reservation wages of both types of workers (with high and low social capital)
are below the unemployment benefit z, so that no job is rejected by unemployed workers. This
is an extesnion of the result by Burdett and Mortensen (1998) who show that in the absence of
referrals the reservation wage should be exactly equal to the unemployment benefit if on-the-
job search is equally efficient as off-the-job search. Efficiency here is measured in terms of the
job-finding rate λ. The situation is different with referrals since workers are more likely to form
social contacts when employed and they are more likely to lose their contacts when unemployed.
Due to the problem of unobserved information connected workers have to form probabilistic
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beliefs about the flow income of their dyad partners. For this reason let p˜j denote a probability
density function of the productivity distribution considering only connected workers: p˜j = P˜j −
P˜j−1. The cumulative density function P˜j can be obtained as: P˜j = (Gnj+Gjn+2Hj)/(dm+2de).
In order to simplify the analysis I assume that p˜j is a belief distribution for both employed and
unemployed dyad partners and there is no learning by means of the information exchange within
a dyad. This assumption is clearly restrictive but it allows me to preserve the tractability of the
model. Bellman equations for unemployed workers are then given by:
rU = z + λ
n∑
i=1
(Vi − U)pii
rU˜ = z + λ
n∑
i=1
(V˜i − U˜)pii + λ(1− µ)
n∑
j=1
j∑
i=1
(V˜i − U˜)piip˜j︸ ︷︷ ︸
network effects
−2µα(U˜ − U)
Suppose the dyad partner of the unemployed worker is employed at productivity yj . Continuing
to search on-the-job this partner will accept job offers with a productivity level above yj and
will forward all jobs weakly below yj to the connected worker. This means that the attachment
value gain of the worker is given by
∑j
i=1(V˜i− U˜)pii. Neverthless, the productivity variable yj is
not observed by the worker, this gives rise to the expected value gain
∑n
j=1
∑j
i=1(V˜i − U˜)piip˜j ,
reflecting the fact that the dyad partner can be employed at any productivity y1, ..., yn with the
corresponding probabilities p˜1, ..., p˜n. Similarly, Bellman equations for employed workers are:
rVk = wk + λ
n∑
i=k+1
(Vi − Vk)pii + 2φ(V˜k − Vk)− δ(Vk − U)
rV˜k = wk + λ
n∑
i=k+1
(V˜i − V˜k)pii + λ(1− µ)
n∑
j=k+1
j∑
i=k+1
(V˜i − V˜k)piip˜j︸ ︷︷ ︸
network effects
−δ(V˜k − U˜)
Consider both types of unemployed workers obtaining a job offer y1. The net value gains from
accepting this job are R1 = V1−U and R˜1 = V˜1− U˜ for unemployed workers with low and high
social capital, respectively. These value variables can be written as:
(r + δ + λ+ 2φ)R1 = w1 − z + 2φ(R˜1 +∆U)
(r + δ + λ(1 + (1− µ)F˜ ))R˜1 = w1 − z + 2µα∆U where F˜ =
n∑
j=1
Fj p˜j
Similar to the binary case these equations show that the reservation wages of unemployed workers
are below z if ∆U > 0 which is the endogenous value of social capital. Intuitively, unemployed
workers with low social capital accept low paid jobs to gain the chance to form social contacts
in a working environment, at the same time connected unemployed workers accept these jobs in
order to keep the existing contacts. Proposition 6 provides a formal proof of these results.
Proposition 6: Let Fi = P{y ≤ yi}, i = 1, .., n denote a cumulative density function of the
productivity distribution yi with a corresponding wage wi = βyi+(1−β)z such that y1 ≥ z where
z denotes the unemployment benefit. If connected workers search on-the-job and exchange wage
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offers below their current income, then reservation wages of unemployed workers with high/low
social capital are below the unemployment benefit z. Proof: Appendix V.
5 Conclusions
Empirical studies report that referrals can lead to premiums or penalties in wages. Therefore,
this paper analyses the role of economic conditions in the labour market in generating a positive
or a negative effect of referrals on wages. To address this question I develop a labour market
matching model with referrals, heterogeneous firms and on-the-job search. Moreover, social
capital is endogenous in the model. When employed, workers can form dyadic ties with their
colleagues, however there is a positive probability of dissolving for the tie if both workers are
unemployed in the future. Therefore, the total number of dyads is endogenous in the model and
the equilibrium unemployment is decreasing in the intensity of contact formation. At the same
time, unemployed workers are endogenously differentiated by social capital, since connected
workers have better outside opportunities than unemployed workers without contacts. In this
setup bargaining over wages leads to endogenous binary wage dispersion in the model, so that
connected workers earn higher wages for a given level of productivity (reservation wage effect).
The major contribution of this paper is to show that on-the-job search with referrals leads
to a negative selection of referred workers to low productivity jobs. Note that this result obtains
in a setup when employees help their unemployed contacts find a job (first information regime).
Intuitively, workers accept job offers from firms more productive than their current employer,
at the same time job offers from less productive employers are not lost, instead workers forward
these jobs to their unemployed acquaintances. This means that the productivity distribution
of transferred offers is truncated from above. Therefore, the average productivity of a referred
worker is lower than the average productivity in the market (selection effect).
Next, this paper investigates the interaction between the positive reservation wage effect
and the negative productivity effect. First, wage premiums are small and the negative effect
of referrals is dominating in a labour market with high productivity heterogeneity and strong
worker’s bargaining power. The latter result is explained by the fact that wages are more sensitive
to productivities and less sensitive to reservation wages if the bargaining power of workers is
relatively low. This could explain the existing empirical evidence for Italy and Portugal (see
Pistaferri (1999) and Addison and Portugal (2002)), where the labour market is characterized
by wage penalties associated with referrals. On the contrary, wage penalties are small and the
positive effect of referrals is dominating in a labour market with low productivity heterogeneity
and weak worker’s bargaining power. So the model is also compatible with the empirical evidence
for Austria, Belgium and the Netherlands where informal search channels lead to significantly
better paying jobs (see Pelizzari (2010)).
Finally, this study demonstrates that social networks may reduce inequality in a homogeneous
group of workers. On-the-job search, when workers help each other climb the wage ladder, is
a crucial component for this result. On the one hand, workers employed in low productivity
jobs pool their dyad partners towards better paid jobs in the middle range of the productivity
distribution. This means that low productivity jobs are less stable and there are less of them in
the stationary equilibrium. On the other hand, high productivity jobs are rearely transmitted
24
through social contacts, therefore, the relative fraction of workers in this group is reduced given
the total growth in employment. As a result in the equilibrium there is more probability mass in
the middle range of the productivity distribution, so the variance of the distribution is reduced.
6 Appendix
Appendix I: Proof of lemmas 1-2. From differential equations e˙0 = 0, u˙0 = 0, d˙e = 0 and d˙u = 0 express
variables e0, u0, de and dm in terms of du:
δdm = 2(α+ λ)du λφu0 = 2αdu(2φ+ δ) φe0 = 2αdu
2δde = λ(1 + pi)dm + φe0 = λ(1 + pi)
2(α+ λ)du
δ
+ 2αdu
δ2de = [λ(1 + pi)(α+ λ) + αδ]du
The total labour force is normalized to 1, so that 1 = 2(du + de + dm) + e0 + u0, this yields:
1 = 2du
[
1 +
λ(1 + pi)(α+ λ) + αδ
δ2
+
2(α+ λ)
δ
]
+ 2αdu
[2φ+ δ
λφ
+
1
φ
]
This means the equilibrium measure of unemployed dyads du can be obtained as:
du =
0.5δ2λφ
(λ+ δ)[(λ+ δ + α)λφ+ αδ(2φ+ δ)] + λ2piφ(α+ λ)
=
0.5δ2φλ
(λ+ δ)s+ λ2piφ(α+ λ)
The differential equations for d˙1m, d˙
1
e, d˙
c
e and e˙
1
0 are given by:
d˙1m = 2λpidu − δd
1
m − λ(1− pi)d
1
m − λ(1− pi)d
1
m − 2λpid
1
m + 2δd
1
e + δd
c
e
d˙1e = 2λpid
1
m − 2λ(1− pi)d
1
e + φe
1
0 − 2δd
1
e
d˙ce = 2λpid
2
m + λ(1− pi)d
1
m + 2λ(1− pi)d
1
e − λ(1− pi)d
c
e − 2δd
c
e
e˙10 = λpiu0 − δe
1
0 − λ(1− pi)e
1
0 − 2φe
1
0
This allows to find the equilibrium variables e10 and e
2
0:
e10 =
λpiu0
δ + 2φ+ λ(1− pi)
=
αδ2(2φ+ δ)λpi
(δ + 2φ+ λ(1− pi))((λ+ δ)s+ λ2piφ(α+ λ))
e20 = e0 − e
1
0 =
αδ2λ
(λ+ δ)s+ λ2piφ(α+ λ)
[
1−
pi(2φ+ δ)
2φ+ δ + λ(1− pi)
]
Variables p1 and p2 are then obtained as: p1 = e
1
0/(1−u) and p2 = e
2
0/(1−u). In addition, in the steady
state it should be true that 0 = 2d˙1e + d˙
c
e:
0 = 2[2λpid1m − 2λ(1− pi)d
1
e + φe
1
0 − 2δd
1
e] + 2λpid
2
m
+ λ(1− pi)d1m + 2λ(1− pi)d
1
e − λ(1− pi)d
c
e − 2δd
c
e
= 2λpid1m + 2λpidm − 2λ(1− pi)d
1
e + φe
1
0 + λ(1− pi)d
1
m − 2δ(d
c
e + 2δ
1
e)− λ(1− pi)d
c
e
So that the total measure of workers employed at wage w1 in employed dyads (d
c
e + 2d
1
e) becomes:
dce + 2d
1
e =
λ(1 + pi)d1m + 2λpidm + 2φe
1
0
2δ + λ(1− pi)
d1m =
2λpidu(2δ + 2(α+ λ) + λ(1− pi)) + 2φδe
1
0
2(δ + λ)(δ + λ(1− pi))
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where the last equation for d1m follows from d˙
1
m = 0 which means (δ + 2λ)d
1
m = 2λpidu + δ(d
c
e + 2d
1
e).
The equilibrium productivity distribution is then given by p(y1) = p˜1 + p1 = (2d
1
e + d
c
e + d
1
m + e
1
0)/e and
p(y2) = p˜2 + p2 = 1− p(y1):
2d1e + d
c
e + d
1
m + e
1
0 =
λpidm(δ + 2(α+ λ))
(α+ λ)(δ + λ(1− pi))
+
e10(δ + 2φ+ λ(1− pi))
δ + λ(1− pi)
p(y1) =
λpi(δ + 2(α+ λ))
(α+ λ)(δ + λ(1− pi))
·
δ(α+ λ)φ
s+ λpiφ(α+ λ)
+
piαδ2(2φ+ δ)
(δ + λ(1− pi))(s+ λpiφ(α+ λ))
=
piδ
δ + λ(1− pi)
[ s+ λφ(α+ λ)
s+ λpiφ(α+ λ)
]
=
piδ
δ + λ(1− pi)
[
1 +
λ(1− pi)φ(α+ λ)
s+ λpiφ(α+ λ)
]
Appendix II: Proof of proposition 1.
Define the total surplus values Si = Ri + Ji and S˜i = R˜i + J˜i, i = 1, 2 so that:
∆S ≡ S˜1 − S1 = S˜2 − S2 =
2∆U(µα− φ)− λpiβ(1− µ)S˜1
δ + 2φ+ λ(1− pi) + λpiβ
where variable ∆U can be obtained from equation:
2µα∆U = λpi((2− µ)R˜1 −R1) + λ(1− pi)(R˜2 −R2)
= λpiβ(∆S + (1− µ)S˜1) + λ(1− pi)β∆S = λβ∆S + λpiβ(1− µ)S˜1
Let σ = µα(δ + 2φ+ λ(1− pi)(1− β)) + φλβ, then
σ2∆U = λpiβ(1− µ)(δ + 2φ+ λ(1− pi)(1− β))S˜1
2∆U =
λpiβ(1− µ)(δ + 2φ+ λ(1− pi)(1− β))
σ(δ + λ(1− pi) + λpiβ) + λpiβ(1− µ)φλβ
(y1 − z)
Further, define a new auxilliary variable ρ = δ + 2φ+ λ(1− pi), then
∆S + (1− µ)S˜1 =
2∆U(µα− φ) + (1− µ)ρS˜1
ρ+ λpiβ
so that the wage difference ∆w can be expressed as:
∆w
1− β
= λpiβ(∆S + (1− µ)S˜1)− 2∆U(µα− φ) =
ρ
ρ+ λpiβ
[2∆U(φ− µα) + λpiβ(1− µ)S˜1]
=
ρ(1− µ)
(ρ+ λpiβ)σ
[(ρ− λβ(1− pi))(φ− αµ) + σ]λpiβS˜1
=
ρφ2∆U
(ρ− λβ(1− pi))
=
(δ + 2φ+ λ(1− pi))φ
δ + 2φ+ λ(1− pi)(1− β)
2∆U
The sign of ∂∆w/∂α is determined by the sign of ∂∆U/∂α and therefore depends on the change in the
ratio σ/(1− µ), which can be obtained as:
σ
1− µ
=
δ
α+ λ
[α(ρ− λβ(1− pi)) + φλβ] + φλβ
= δ(ρ− λβ(1− pi)) + φλβ −
δλ
α+ λ
[δ + φ(2− β) + λ(1− pi)(1− β)]
so that σ/(1− µ) is increasing in α, this means ∂∆U/∂α < 0 and ∂∆w/∂α < 0. Further, define variable
d in the following way: d = φλβ/[δ + 2φ + λ(1 − pi)(1 − β)], this means ∂d/∂φ > 0. Variables ∆U and
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∆w can then be expressed in terms of d:
2∆U =
λpiβ(1− µ)(y1 − z)
(µα+ d)(δ + λ(1− pi) + λpiβ) + λpiβ(1− µ)d
⇒
∂∆U
∂d
< 0
∆w =
piρd(1− µ)(y1 − z)
(µα+ d)(δ + λ(1− pi) + λpiβ) + λpiβ(1− µ)d
⇒
∂∆w
∂d
> 0
Therefore ∂∆U/∂φ < 0 but ∂∆w/∂φ > 0.
Appendix III: Proof of propositions 2-3. Define an auxilliary function ∆W (β) = ∆w/β:
∆W (β) =
∆w
β
=
λpi(1− β)(1− µ)(δ + 2φ+ λ(1− pi))φ
σ(δ + λ(1− pi) + λpiβ) + λpiβ(1− µ)φλβ
(y1 − z) (6.4)
The ratio σ/(1− β) is an increasing function of β, so that ∆W ′(β) < 0 for β < 1.
w˜1 − w¯ < 0 ∀ 0 < β < 1 ⇔
(p1 + p2)∆W (β) < ∆y(p2 + p˜2) ∀ 0 < β < 1 ⇔
(p1 + p2)∆W (0) < ∆y(p2 + p˜2)⇔
λpi(1− µ)φ
(δ + λ(1− pi))
αδ2(y1 − z)
s+ λpiφ(α+ λ)
<
(1− pi)∆y
δ + λ(1− pi)
[
λ+
δs
s+ λpiφ(α+ λ)
]
This gives rise to the following inequality:
h(pi) ≡
λpi(1− µ)φαδ2
(1− pi)(s(λ+ δ) + λ2piφ(α+ λ))
<
y2 − y1
y1 − z
Function h(pi) is such that h(0) = 0, h′(pi) > 0 and it converges to infinity for pi → 1, this means that the
last inequality defines a unique value of 0 < pi∗ < 1. In addition (1− µ)δ = (α+ λ)µ.
Appendix IV: Proof of propositions 3-4. The distibution Hk can be expressed from equation (4.1):
Hk(δ + λ+ λ(1− Fk)) = λFkdu − λ
k∑
i=1
Fihi +
δλ(1− Fk)Hk
2δ + λ(1− Fk)
+ δ
λFkdm + φQk + 2λ
∑k
i=1 Fihi
2δ + λ(1− Fk)
Hk[(δ + λ+ λ(1− Fk))(2δ + λ(1− Fk))− δλ(1− Fk)]
= (λFkdu − λ
k∑
i=1
Fihi)(2δ + λ(1− Fk)) + δλFkdm + δφQk + 2λδ
k∑
i=1
Fihi
= λFk[du(2δ + λ(1− Fk)) + δdm] + δφQk − λ
2(1− Fk)
k∑
i=1
Fihi
Hk[(δ + λ(1− Fk))(2δ + λ(1− Fk)) + λ(δ + λ(1− Fk)) + λFk(δ + λ(1− Fk)]
= λFk[(2δ + λ(1− Fk)) + 2(α+ λ)]du + δ0.5dmQ˜k + λ
2(1− Fk)0.5dm
k∑
i=1
(Fk − Fi)h˜i
H˜k(δ + λ(1− Fk))2(δ + λ) = λFk[2(δ + λ) + 2α+ λ(1− Fk)]
δ
α+ λ
+ δQ˜k + λ
2(1− Fk)
k−1∑
i=1
(Fk − Fi)h˜i where H˜i = Hi/0.5dm h˜i = hi/0.5dm
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Further, H∗k can be obtained from equation (4.1) without network effects:
H∗k(δ + λ+ λ(1− Fk)) = λFkd
∗
u + δ
λH∗k + λFk0.5d
∗
m + φQ
∗
k
2δ + λ(1− Fk)
H˜∗k(δ + λ(1− Fk))(2δ + λ+ λ(1− Fk)) = λFk
δ
α+ λ
(2δ + λ(1− Fk) + α+ λ) + δQ˜
∗
k
where Q˜∗k =
φQ∗k
0.5d∗m
=
2αδFk(δ + 2φ)
(α+ λ)(δ + 2φ+ λ(1− Fk))
= Q˜k
H˜∗k − H˜k =
λδFk
(α+ λ)(δ + λ(1− Fk))
[ α
2δ + λ+ λ(1− Fk)
−
2α+ λ(1− Fk)
2(δ + λ)
]
+
δQ˜k
δ + λ(1− Fk)
[ 1
2δ + λ+ λ(1− Fk)
−
1
2(δ + λ)
]
−
λ2(1− Fk)
∑k−1
i=1 h˜i(Fk − Fi)
(δ + λ(1− Fk))2(δ + λ)
= −
λδFk[(δ + λ(1− Fk))(2α+ λ(1− Fk)) + (δ + λ)λ(1− Fk)]
(α+ λ)(δ + λ(1− Fk))(2δ + λ+ λ(1− Fk))2(δ + λ)
+
δλFkQ˜k − (2δ + λ+ λ(1− Fk))λ
2(1− Fk)
∑k−1
i=1 h˜i(Fk − Fi)
(δ + λ(1− Fk))(2δ + λ+ λ(1− Fk))2(δ + λ)
To complete the proof of proposition 3, it should be shown that this expression is negative:
−(δ + λ(1− Fk))2α+ (α+ λ)Q˜k = −(δ + λ(1− Fk))2α+
2αδFk(δ + 2φ)
δ + 2φ+ λ(1− Fk)
= −2α(1− Fk)(λ+ δ)−
2αδFkλ(1− Fk)
δ + 2φ+ λ(1− Fk)
< 0 ⇒ H˜∗k < H˜k
Ek =
2λHk(1− Fk) + 2λFkdm + 2φQk + 4λ
∑k
i=1 Fihi]
2δ + λ(1− Fk)
+ 2Hk +Qk
=
2[Hk(2δ + 2λ(1− Fk)) + λFkdm + 2λ
∑k
i=1 Fihi]
2δ + λ(1− Fk)
+
(2(φ+ δ) + λ(1− Fk))
2δ + λ(1− Fk)
Qk
=
λδFk[2(δ + α+ λ) + λ(1− Fk)]dm
(α+ λ)(δ + λ(1− Fk))(2δ + λ(1− Fk))
+
δQ˜k + λ
2(1− Fk)
∑k−1
i=1 h˜i(Fk − Fi)
(δ + λ(1− Fk))(2δ + λ(1− Fk))
dm
+
[2λFk + 2λ
∑k
i=1(Fi − Fk)h˜i]dm
2δ + λ(1− Fk)
+
(2(φ+ δ) + λ(1− Fk))
2δ + λ(1− Fk)
Qk
= λFkdm
δ(δ + λ(1− Fk)) + δ(δ + 2(λ+ α)) + 2(α+ λ)(δ + λ(1− Fk))
(α+ λ)(δ + λ(1− Fk))(2δ + λ(1− Fk))
+ λdm
[λ(1− Fk)− 2δ − 2λ(1− Fk)]
∑k
i=1(Fk − Fi)h˜i
(δ + λ(1− Fk))(2δ + λ(1− Fk))
+
2φδQk
(δ + λ(1− Fk))(2δ + λ(1− Fk))
+
(2(φ+ δ) + λ(1− Fk))
2δ + λ(1− Fk)
Qk
= λdm
[Fk(δ + 2(λ+ α))− (α+ λ)
∑k
i=1(Fk − Fi)h˜i]
(α+ λ)(δ + λ(1− Fk))
+
2φ+ δ + λ(1− Fk)
δ + λ(1− Fk)
Qk
= λdm
[Fk(δ + 2(λ+ α))− (α+ λ)
∑k
i=1(Fk − Fi)h˜i]
(α+ λ)(δ + λ(1− Fk))
+
2αduFk(δ + 2φ)
φ(δ + λ(1− Fk))
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This means that with network effects the cumulative density function P (yk) = Ek/e is given by:
Ek
e
=
λ[Fk(δ + 2(λ+ α))− (α+ λ)
∑k
i=1(Fk − Fi)h˜i]
(α+ λ)(δ + λ(1− Fk))
·
δλ(λ+ α)φ
λ(s+ λφF¯ (α+ λ))
+
2αFk(δ + 2φ)
φ(δ + λ(1− Fk))
·
0.5δ2λφ
λ(s+ λφF¯ (α+ λ))
=
λδφ[Fk(δ + 2(λ+ α))− (α+ λ)
∑k
i=1(Fk − Fi)h˜i] + αδ
2Fk(δ + 2φ)
(δ + λ(1− Fk))(s+ λφF¯ (α+ λ))
=
δFk[λφ(δ + λ+ α) + αδ(δ + 2φ)] + λδφ(λ+ α)[Fk −
∑k
i=1(Fk − Fi)h˜i]
(δ + λ(1− Fk))(s+ λφF¯ (α+ λ))
=
δFk[s+ λφF¯ (α+ λ)]
(δ + λ(1− Fk))(s+ λφF¯ (α+ λ))
+
λδφ(λ+ α)[Fk(1− F¯ )−
∑k
i=1(Fk − Fi)h˜i]
(δ + λ(1− Fk))(s+ λφF¯ (α+ λ))
=
δFk
(δ + λ(1− Fk))
+
λδφ(λ+ α)[Fk(1− F¯ )−
∑k
i=1(Fk − Fi)h˜i]
(δ + λ(1− Fk))(s+ λφF¯ (α+ λ))
Without network effects, the measure of workers E∗k can be obtained as:
E∗k = G
∗
n,k +G
∗
k,n + 2H
∗
k +Q
∗
k =
2λH∗k + λFkd
∗
m + 2φQ
∗
k
2δ + λ(1− Fk)
+ 2H∗k +Q
∗
k
=
λFkd
∗
m[δ(δ + λ(1− Fk)) + δ(δ + λ+ α) + (α+ λ)(δ + λ(1− Fk))]
(α+ λ)(δ + λ(1− Fk))(2δ + λ(1− Fk))
+
2φδQ∗k
(δ + λ(1− Fk))(2δ + λ(1− Fk))
+
(2(φ+ δ) + λ(1− Fk))
2δ + λ(1− Fk)
Q∗k
=
λFk(δ + α+ λ)(2δ + λ(1− Fk))d
∗
m
(α+ λ)(δ + λ(1− Fk))(2δ + λ(1− Fk))
+
2φ+ δ + λ(1− Fk)
δ + λ(1− Fk)
Q∗k
=
λFk(δ + α+ λ)d
∗
m
(α+ λ)(δ + λ(1− Fk))
+
2αd∗uFk(δ + 2φ)
φ(δ + λ(1− Fk))
Therefore, without network effects, the cumulative density function P ∗(yk) = E
∗
k/e
∗ is given by:
E∗k
e∗
=
λFk(δ + α+ λ)
(α+ λ)(δ + λ(1− Fk))
·
δλ(α+ λ)φ
λs
+
2αFk(δ + 2φ)
φ(δ + λ(1− Fk))
·
0.5δ2λφ
λs
=
δFks
(δ + λ(1− Fk))s
Next, it can be shown that P (yk) > P
∗(yk) ∀k = 1..n− 1, since:
Fk(1− F¯ )−
k∑
i=1
(Fk − Fi)h˜i = Fk − Fk
( k∑
i=1
Fih˜i +
n∑
i=k+1
Fih˜i
)
− Fk
k∑
i=1
h˜i +
k∑
i=1
Fih˜i
= Fk
(
1−
n∑
i=k+1
Fih˜i −
k∑
i=1
h˜i +
n∑
i=k+1
h˜i −
n∑
i=k+1
h˜i
)
+ (1− Fk)
k∑
i=1
Fih˜i
= Fk
n∑
i=k+1
(1− Fi)h˜i + (1− Fk)
k∑
i=1
Fih˜i > 0 for k = 1..n− 1
Appendix V: Proof of proposition 5. The suplus value R1 = V1 − U can be expressed as:
(r + δ)(V1 − U) = w1 − z − λpi1(V1 − U)− λ
n∑
i=2
(Vi − U − Vi + V1)pii + 2φ(V˜1 − V1)
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So that (r + δ + λ)(V1 − U) = w1 − z + 2φ(V˜1 − V1). Similarly, R˜1 = V˜1 − U˜ is:
(r + δ)(V˜1 − U˜) = w1 − z − λ(V˜1 − U˜) + 2µα(U˜ − U)
+ λ(1− µ)
n∑
j=2
j∑
i=2
(V˜i − V˜1)piip˜j − λ(1− µ)
n∑
j=1
j∑
i=1
(V˜i − U˜)piip˜j
(r + δ + λ)(V˜1 − U˜) = w1 − z + 2µα∆U + λ(1− µ)
n∑
j=2
j∑
i=2
(V˜i − V˜1)piip˜j
− λ(1− µ)pi1(V˜1 − U˜)− λ(1− µ)
n∑
j=2
j∑
i=2
(V˜i − U˜)piip˜j = w1 − z + 2µα∆U
− λ(1− µ)pi1(V˜1 − U˜) + λ(1− µ)
n∑
j=2
j∑
i=2
(V˜i − V˜1 − V˜i + U˜)piip˜j
This means (r + δ + λ(1 + (1− µ)F˜ ))(V˜1 − U˜) = w1 − z + 2µα∆U where F˜ =
∑n
j=1 Fj p˜j .
rVk−1 = wk−1 + λ
n∑
i=k
(Vi − Vk−1)pii + 2φ(V˜k−1 − Vk−1)− δ(Vk−1 − U)
Next, consider value gains from on-the-job search Vk − Vk−1 and V˜k − V˜k−1:
(r + δ + 2φ)(Vk − Vk−1) = ∆wk−1 + λ
n∑
i=k+1
(Vi − Vk)pii − λ
n∑
i=k
(Vi − Vk−1)pii + 2φ(V˜k − V˜k−1)
= ∆wk−1 + λ
n∑
i=k+1
(−Vk + Vk−1)pii − λ(Vk − Vk−1)pik + 2φ(V˜k − V˜k−1)
= ∆wk−1 − λ(Vk − Vk−1)(1− Fk−1) + 2φ(V˜k − V˜k−1)
rV˜k−1 = wk−1 + λ
n∑
i=k
(V˜i − V˜k−1)pii + λ(1− µ)
n∑
j=k
j∑
i=k
(V˜i − V˜k−1)piip˜j − δ(V˜k − U˜)
(r + δ)(V˜k − V˜k−1) = ∆wk−1 + λ
n∑
i=k+1
(V˜i − V˜k)pii + λ(1− µ)
n∑
j=k+1
j∑
i=k+1
(V˜i − V˜k)piip˜j
− λ
n∑
i=k
(V˜i − V˜k−1)pii − λ(1− µ)
n∑
j=k
j∑
i=k
(V˜i − V˜k−1)piip˜j
= ∆wk−1 − λ(V˜k − V˜k−1)(1− Fk−1)− λ(1− µ)(V˜k − V˜k−1)pikp˜k
− λ(1− µ)
n∑
j=k+1
[
(V˜k − V˜k−1)pik +
j∑
i=k+1
(V˜k − V˜k−1)pii)
]
p˜j
(r + δ + λ(1− Fk−1))(V˜k − V˜k−1) = ∆wk−1 − λ(1− µ)(V˜k − V˜k−1)(Fk − Fk−1)p˜k
− λ(1− µ)(V˜k − V˜k−1)
n∑
j=k+1
(Fj − Fk−1)p˜j
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Therefore, one-step surplus gains Vk − Vk−1 and V˜k − V˜k−1 can be written as:
(V˜k − V˜k−1) =
∆wk−1
r + δ + λ(1− Fk−1)(1 + Σk−1)
> 0, k = 2..n
(Vk − Vk−1) = (V˜k − V˜k−1)
[
1 +
λ(1− Fk−1)Σk−1
r + δ + 2φ+ λ(1− Fk−1)
]
> 0, k = 2..n
where Σk−1 = (1− µ)
∑n
j=k(Fj − Fk−1)p˜j
1− Fk−1
> 0
Let r → 0 and note that V˜n − Vn = δ∆U/(δ + 2φ), so that:
V˜k − Vk = V˜k+1 − Vk+1 +
λ∆wk(1− Fk)Σk
(δ + λ(1− Fk)(1 + Σk))(δ + 2φ+ λ(1− Fk))
=
δ∆U
δ + 2φ
+ λ
n∑
i=k
∆wi(1− Fi)Σi
(δ + λ(1− Fi)(1 + Σi))(δ + 2φ+ λ(1− Fi))
, k = 1..n
where ∆wn = 0 by assumption. Denote the second term in the above expression by Ak, so that V˜k−Vk =
δ∆U/(δ + 2φ) +Ak, where Ak > 0 ∀k = 1..n− 1 and An = 0. Finally, variable ∆U can be found as:
(λ+ 2µα)∆U = λ
n∑
i=1
(V˜i − Vi)pii + λ(1− µ)
n∑
j=1
j∑
i=1
(V˜i − U˜)piip˜j
= λ
n∑
i=1
( δ∆U
δ + 2φ
+Ai
)
pii + λ(1− µ)
n∑
j=1
j∑
i=1
(V˜i − V˜1 + V˜1 − U˜)piip˜j
( λφ
δ + 2φ
+ µα
)
2∆U = λ
n∑
i=1
Aipii + λ(1− µ)
n∑
j=1
j∑
i=1
(V˜i − V˜1)piip˜j + λ(1− µ)(V˜1 − U˜)F˜
= λ
n∑
j=1
Ajpij + λ(1− µ)
n∑
j=1
j∑
i=1
(V˜i+1 − V˜i)(Fj − Fi)p˜j
+ λ(1− µ)F˜
[ w1 − z + 2µα∆U
δ + λ(1 + (1− µ)F˜ )
]
where F˜ =
n∑
j=1
j∑
i=1
piip˜j =
n∑
j=1
Fj p˜j
In addition, summation by parts implies
∑j
i=1(V˜i − V˜1)pii =
∑j
i=1(V˜i+1 − V˜i)(Fj − Fi) and
2∆U
[ λφ
δ + 2φ
+
µα(δ + λ)
δ + λ(1 + (1− µ)F˜ )
]
=
λ(1− µ)F˜ (w1 − z)
δ + λ(1 + (1− µ)F˜ )
+
n∑
j=1
n∑
i=j
λ2∆wi(1− Fi)Σipij
(δ + λ(1− Fi)(1 + Σi))(δ + 2φ+ λ(1− Fi))
+
j∑
i=1
λ(1− µ)∆wi(Fj − Fi)
δ + λ(1− Fi)(1 + Σi)
p˜j
=
n∑
j=1
n∑
i=j
λ2∆wi(1− Fi)Σipij
(δ + λ(1− Fi)(1 + Σi))(δ + 2φ+ λ(1− Fi))
+
j∑
i=0
λ(1− µ)∆wi(Fj − Fi)
δ + λ(1− Fi)(1 + Σi)
p˜j
where ∆w0 = w1 − z and F0 = 0 by assumption, so that Σ0 = (1− µ)
∑n
j=1 Fj p˜j = F˜ .
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